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Antitrust practice is considered by many general practitioners to be arcane, 
complex and mysterious. It is a jargon-ridden world, with rapid developments ex­
panding an evermore complex vocabulary to describe new business practices brought 
within the ebb and flow of antitrust litigation. Most general practitioners are far 
too busy with the daily volume of business to expend effort on the rigorous and 
time-consuming task of self-education in the field or of keeping abreast of the latest 
developments. Consequently, many lawyers have little knowledge of antitrust law 
and a great reluctance to become involved.
The legal profession, clients seeking effective counsel and society at large no 
longer can afford the absence of widespread knowledge of fundamental antitrust 
concepts. While the jargon of the trade and high costs of entry may continue to 
limit specialization in the field to a relative few, most practitioners should be able 
to master a working knowledge of the concepts involved, at least to the point of 
recognizing the existence of antitrust issues and the need for employing expert 
assistance. Too often a failure to counsel clients of the antitrust risks of a parti­
cular course of conduct has generated exposure to a government complaint or 
treble damages and the massive expense of antitrust litigation. By the same token, 
a failure to recognize the antitrust implications of a client’s injury or potential injury 
by the conduct of others or the structure of a particular industry can result in a 
missed opportunity to protect the ongoing interests of a client or to remedy past 
harms.
Society has a broad and growing interest in a widespread familiarity and work­
ing ability with antitrust concepts among the general lawyer population. The 
modern multinational super-corporation has become a social, political and economic 
phenomenon of immense power: unchecked discretionary power beyond the control 
of the state which created it,1 the shareholders who theoretically own it,2 and the 
federal government which supposedly controls it.3 There is mounting evidence that 
the unchecked discretionary power now held by a few hundred large corporations 
has serious social, political and economic ramifications, not the least of which is
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1 See generally R . N a d e r  &  M .  G r e e n ,  C o r p o r a t e  P o w e r  in  A m e r i c a  (1973); Comment, Law 
for Sale: A  Study oj the Delaware Corporation Law o j 1967, 117 U. P a . L. R e v .  861 (1969).
‘ See generally Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule o j Law, in T h e  C o r p o r a t i o n  in  
M o d e r n  S o c i e t y  25 (E. Mason ed. 1960).
*See generally R . B a r b e r ,  T h e  A m e r i c a n  C o r p o r a t i o n :  I t s  P o w e r ,  I t s  M o n e y ,  I t s  P o l i t i c s  
(1970); A .  B e r l e ,  P o w e r  (1970); A .  B e r l e  & G. M e a n s ,  T h e  M o d e r n  C o r p o r a t i o n  a n d  P r i v a t e  
P r o p e r t y  (rev. ed. 1968); J. C o h e n  &  M .  M i n t z ,  A m e r i c a ,  I n c .  (1971).
the responsibility for a substantial contribution to accelerating world-wide inflation.4
A  major challenge facing the legal process will be the development of institu­
tional devices, within the traditions of our constitutional system and in a manner 
consistent with the economic premises of our system, necessary to control the social, 
political and economic power that has accumulated in large modern corporations.
Uncontrolled inflation is a symptom of the absence of economic checks upon 
the massive economic discretion lodged in a few hands. The failure of monetary 
and fiscal controls to contain that inflation is a clear signal that the assumption of a 
competitive marketplace allocating resources and setting prices in response to 
government monetary and fiscal policies is no longer true. Unfortunately, the 
desperate use of wage and price controls to control inflation is an indication of a 
willingness to shift from a theory of free competition to state control in the organi­
zation of our economic affairs.
The choice is fast becoming one of competition or control:5 competition by a 
multitude of independent decision makers free to enter or leave markets and sub­
ject to the discipline of consumers choosing goods and services on the basis of price, 
service and efficiencies; or control by corporate or government bureaucrats of what 
will be sold, at what price, upon what terms and utilizing which resources. The 
risks of controls, corporate or governmental, are not only the economic risks of 
inefficiency, high prices and shortages. They also include social and political risks 
to individual freedom of choice, opportunity and discretion. In this regard, recent 
antitrust litigation has become one of the major tools for fashioning institutional 
controls against the abuse of private economic power. In effect, recent antitrust 
litigation has been fashioning an economic bill of rights to secure economic equality 
of opportunity and to provide due process guarantees against the power of a 
corporate state. For example, as a result of judicial encouragement, there has been 
a dramatic increase in the use of private treble damage litigation over the past few 
decades6 to control an ever-expanding category of abuse of economic power. Cases 
have included litigation to assure gas producers equality of access to a monopolistic 
pipeline,7 and restraints upon the arbitrary use of administrative processes to bar 
new entry into a regulated industry.8 Other cases9 and new legislation10 have 
sought to assure economic due process in vertical market relationships by curbing
1 Hearings on Controls or Competition, Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly o j  the 
Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (see statements o£ Dr. Willard Mueller 
at 11; Dr. Murray L. Weidenbaum at 85; Dr. Allan Meltzer at 88; Dr. Charles Schultze at 91). See 
also papers by W. Mueller, J. Weston & S. Lustgarten in Industrial Concentration: The Economic 
Issues (Mimeo, Columbia Law School Conference, Airlie House, Airlie, Va., Mar. 1 & 2, 1974).
’  See authorities cited note 4 supra.
* See Note, Nolo Pleas in Antitrust Cases, 79 H a r v .  L. R e v .  1475, 1478-79 (1966).
T Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. o£ America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), 
cert, denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
’  California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
* See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 
U.S. 341 (1963); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1972), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 
920 (1974).
10See, e.g., Auto Dealers Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1970); Fair Marketing o£ 
Petroleum Products Act, S. 1694, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (passed the Senate, 120 C o n g .  R e c .  14,425 
[daily ed. Aug. 7, 1974]).
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arbitrary power to terminate those market relationships or to utilize unequal bar­
gaining strength on one side of the relationship to coerce and intimidate the other. 
Consequently, there is a societal interest in broadening the awareness of antitrust 
concepts among lawyers so that the choice between competition or control, or the 
on-going mix of competition and regulation, will be a rational one made with the 
maximum protection of the economic and political goals of our society.
T h e  G o als  o f  A n t it r u s t  P o l ic y
The practitioner who is not immersed in antitrust litigation and practice usually 
does not recognize the antitrust implications of a stated set of facts. This is not 
unusual since sophisticated recognition of the legal implications of a set of facts is 
dependent upon a basic grasp of the field of law involved. Although the practice 
of law principally involves analytical skills, where an ability to analyze the facts 
in light of legal principles in a disciplined and logical manner is fundamental and 
an encyclopedic knowledge of legal rubrics is secondary, it also requires a basic 
knowledge of relevant legal concepts to begin the process of analysis.
How does one develop sufficient expertise to at least recognize the existence of 
potential antitrust problems lurking within the vicinity of a stated set of facts ? It is 
essential to have a firm grasp of the basic goals of antitrust policy in order to be able 
to visualize potential antitrust rights or liabilities within a given set of facts. Con­
sequently, a somewhat mechanical enumeration of antitrust goals for the sake of 
clarity is a useful beginning. From the legislative history of our major antitrust 
laws 11 and the judicial gloss which has been added over several decades, antitrust 
policy may be said to have the following major goals:
1. The maintenance and preservation of the neutral mechanism of competition 
as the rule of trade, in the belief that:
[U]nrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation 
of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest 
material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to 
the preservation of our democratic, political and social institutions.12
2. The promotion of economic efficiency through the stimulus of competitive 
rivalry.13
3. The prevention of private systems of government which impinge upon competi­
tion, resource allocation and the economic, political and social freedoms of 
competitors and consumers.1*
11W .  L e t w i n ,  L a w  a n d  E c o n o m i c  P o l i c y  in  A m e r i c a :  T h e  E v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  S h e r m a n  A n t i ­
t r u s t  A c t  (1965); H .  T h o r e l l i ,  T h e  F e d e r a l  A n t i t r u s t  P o l i c y :  O r i g i n a t i o n  o f  a n  A m e r i c a n  
T r a d i t i o n  (1955) (an excellent study); A .  W a l k e r ,  H i s t o r y  o f  t h e  S h e r m a n  L a w  (1910). See also 
Standard Oil Co. o£ N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Addyston Pipe 
& Steel Co., 85 F.271 (6th Cir. 1898), afi’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
12 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Co., 310 U.S. 150 n.59 (1940).
“ United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. United 
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), a ffd  per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
l4Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Fashion Originators’ Guild of America v. 
FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 242 (1899).
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4. The prevention of restraints upon the alienation of tangible property and other 
commercial values.15
5. The preservation of economic and political independence in the decision-making 
processes of commercial and other relationships.16
Many economists and some lawyers believe that the sole goal of antitrust policy 
should be the promotion of economic efficiency. However, the legislative history 
of the major antitrust laws and the judicial interpretations of those laws have 
stressed the political and social goals of antitrust policy in addition to the goal of 
economic efficiency.17 Consequendy, a responsible attorney in advising a client 
or preparing a lawsuit should never assume that the sole goal of antitrust policy 
is the promotion of economic efficiency. Thus, for example, if a client is about to 
engage in activity which impinges upon the neutral mechanism of competition for 
setting prices or allocating resources, or which creates a private governmental 
mechanism for setting prices or allocating resources, or which impinges upon inde­
pendence in reaching economic decisions, an antitrust violation may be lurking in 
the vicinity, even though the practice may be economically efficient.
Where does the practitioner go from here? Ultimately, of course, he must resort 
to the antitrust statutes, the cases and the legal literature commenting upon devel­
opments in the field. Before entering this maze, however, it is best to obtain a 
broad perspective of the area involved so that subsequent effort will be efficient. To  
assist the attorney when he goes to the books, I have prepared an annotated 
antitrust bibliography, set out as an appendix to this article, designed to provide 
references wherein one may obtain an overview of antitrust concepts as well as 
detailed analysis of particular doctrines. But before one becomes enmeshed in the 
particularities found in treatises on the subject, an overview of the statutes is 
necessary.
S t a t u t o r y  P r o v is io n s
It is impossible in a single article to enumerate the kinds of fact situations which 
may give rise to an antitrust violation. They are as numerous as the events in 
human experience that give rise to tort claims. However, the panorama of antitrust 
legislation, when viewed against the backdrop of the basic goals of antitrust policy, 
may provide some idea of the incredible variety of possible violations that may 
occur in the day-to-day operation of any form of economic activity. Because the 
focus of an antitrust lawsuit changes in accord with the statutory basis of the suit, 
one must have some familiarity with the complex and wide-ranging legisladon on 
the books to appreciate the potential of modern antitrust law.
“ United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John 
D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
“ Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 
359 U.S. 207 (1959); American Medical Ass’n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); Marjorie Webster 
Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass’n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc. 302 F. Supp. 459 
(D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
JT See Association for Antitrust Studies, Statement o f Organization and Purposes, 2 A n t i t r u s t  L. & 
E c o n .  R e v . ,  Winter, 1968-69, at 77; Report of the White House Task. Force on Antitrust Policy, 2 
A n t i t r u s t  L .  & E c o n .  R e v . ,  Winter, 1968-69, at 11, 53 (separate statement of Robert H. Bork).
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The basic antitrust laws are as set forth below.
A . The Sherman Act,18 which prohibits:
1. Contracts in unreasonable restraint of trade;19
2. Combinations in unreasonable restraint of trade;20
3. Conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of trade;21
4. Monopolization of any part of trade or commerce;22
5. Conspiracies to monopolize any part of trade or commerce;23 and
6. Attempts to monopolize any part of trade or commerce.24
B. The Clayton Act,25 which prohibits:
1. The lease, sale or contract of sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, 
supplies or other goods or commodities (whether patented or not) on the 
condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser shall 
not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or 
commodities of a competitor or competitor of the lessee or seller;26
2. Stock or asset acquisitions which may substantially lessen competition or 
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce;27 and
3. Certain types of interlocking directorates.28
C. The Robinson-Patman Amendments to Section 2 of the Clayton Act,29 
which prohibit:
“ Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
10 Str generally Turner, The Definition o f Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism 
and Refusals to Deal, 75 H a r v .  L. R e v ,  655 (1962).
20 See generally Note, Combinations in Restraint oj Trade: A  New Approach to Section 1 o f the 
Sherman Act, 1966 U t a h  L. R e v .  75.
21 See generally United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Turner, supra note 19. 
23See generally United States v. Grinncll Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 
295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); C. K a y s i n  & D. T u r n e r ,  A n t i t r u s t  
P o l i c y  (1959); Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts— From "Economic 
Theory to Legal Policy 19 S t a n .  L. R e v .  285 (1967); Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane 
Case, 70 H a r v .  L. R e v .  281 (1956).
23 See generally United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Turner, supra note 22.
24See generally Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1964), cert, denied, 377 U.S. 
993 (1964); Note, Prosecutions for Attempts to Monopolize: The Relevance of the Relevant Market, 42 
N.Y.U.L. R e v .  110 (1967); Note, Attempt to Monopolize: The Offense Redefined, 1969 U t a h  L. R e v .  
704 [hereinafter cited as Attempt to M onopolize].
25 Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964).
26 See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); See generally Note, Newcomer Defenses: Reasonable Use o f Tie-ins, 
Franchises, Territorials, and "Exclusives, 18 S t a n .  L. R ev. 457 (1966); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United 
States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
27See generally S. O p p e n h e im  & G. W e s t o n ,  F e d e r a l  A n t i t r u s t  L a w s :  C a s e s  & C o m m e n t s  315­
443 (1968); Symposium, Antitrust Symposium, 1969 U t a h  L. R e v .  617; The Department of Justice 
Merger Guidelines (May 30, 1968), 1 J. R p t .  f o r  A n t i t r u s t  L .  & E c o n .  181 (1969).
28 Jacobs, Interlocks, 29 A B A  A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 204 (1965).
29R o b in s o n -P a t m a n  Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964). See
generally F. R o w e ,  P r i c e  D i s c r i m i n a t i o n  U n d e r  t h e  R o b in s o n - P a t m a n  A c t  (1962, Supp. 1964).
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1. Price discrimination where the effect of the discrimination may be to 
lessen substantially competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line 
of commerce; or injure, destroy or prevent competition with any person 
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination 
or with the customers of either of them;
2. Certain types of brokerage; and
3. Certain types of service discrimination.30
Antitrust lawyers sort out this maze of principal antitrust statutes by reviewing 
a series of questions which signal the applicability or unavailability of a particular 
statute:
1. What is the degree of an effect on commerce?
The Sherman Act reaches any conduct which “affects” commerce,31 while the 
Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman Act generally require a more direct in­
volvement with interstate commerce by using the standard of “in commerce.” 32 
The absence of any involvement with interstate commerce, however, does not 
necessarily preclude antitrust analysis because most states have antitrust laws33 
which are generally applicable to the same range of economic activity.34
2. Is the activity or industry otherwise regulated by federal or state laws ?
Express regulation through some other statutory scheme may preclude or delay 
antitrust regulation or may immunize certain activity altogether.35 Reference should
K See generally C. A u s t i n ,  P r i c e  D i s c r i m i n a t i o n  a n d  R e l a t e d  P r o b l e m s  U n d e r  t h e  R o b in s o n -  
P a t m a n  A c t  (2d ed. 1959); C. E d w a r d s ,  T h e  P r i c e  D i s c r i m i n a t i o n  L a w :  A  R e v i e w  o f  E x p e r i e n c e
(1959); F. R o w e ,  supra note 29; Millstem, Section 2 (d ) and (e )  Robinson-Patman Act— Compulsory 
Vnivers'l Reciprocity?, 37 ABA A n t i t r u s t  L .J . 77 (1967).
81 In United States v. Women’s Sportswear M£rs. Ass’n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949), the court said 
of the reach o£ the Sherman Act: “ I£ it is interstate commerce that £eels the pinch, it does not matter 
how local the operation which applies the squeeze.” For cases where the “ squeeze” o£ alleged local anti­
competitive conduct did not cause a “pinch” on interstate commerce see Hotel Phillips, Inc. v. Journey­
men Barbers, Hairdressers, Cosmetologists and Proprietors’ Int’l Union o£ America, 301 F.2d 443 ( 8th 
Cir. 1962); Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1961). See generally Eiger, The Commerce Element 
in Federal Antitrust Litigation, 25 F e d .  B.J. 282 (1965); Kallis, Local Conduct and the Sherman Act, 
1959 D u k e  L.J. 236; Krotinger, The "Essentially Local" Doctrine and Section I o f the Sherman Act, 
15 C a s e  W. R e s . L. R e v .  66 (1963).
n See generally Eiger, supra note 31. The commerce requirement o£ the Robinson-Patman Act is 
even more restrictive because the party charged with unlawful discrimination must be engaged “ in 
commerce,” the discrimination must take place “ in the course of such commerce” and at least one of 
the sales upon which the chargc of discrimination is premised must be “ in commerce.” Littlejohn v. 
Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 
455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972).
33 The state antitrust statutes are collected in 4  CCH T r a d e  R e g .  R e p .
84 See generally J. F l y n n ,  F e d e r a l i s m  a n d  S t a t e  A n t i t r u s t  R e g u l a t i o n  (1964); Goldstein, The 
Tariff Is the Mother of Trusts, 39 T e x a s  L. R e v .  711 (1961); R a h l, Toward a Worthwhile Slate 
Antitrust Policy, 39 T e x a s  L. R e v .  753 (1961); Stern, A  Proposed Uniform State Antitrust Law: 
Text and Commentary On a Draft Statute, 39 T e x a s  L. R e v .  717 (1961); Symposium, Stale 
Antitrust Laws, 29 A B A  A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 255 (1965); Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust 
Regulation, 61 C o l u m .  L. R e v .  1469 (1961).
a See generally C . F u l d a ,  C o m p e t i t i o n  in  t h e  R e g u l a t e d  I n d u s t r i e s  (1961); R e p o r t  o f  t h e  
A t t ’ y  G e n .  N a t ’ l  C o m m . A n t i t r u s t  R e p .  261-93 (1955); Hale & Hale, Competition or Control I :  
The Chaos in the Cases, 106 U. P a . L. R e v .  641 (1958); Schwartz, Legal Restriction o f Competition In 
The Regulated Industries: An Abdication o f Judicial Responsibility, 67 H a r v .  L. R e v .  436 (1954).
be made to state and federal laws which have conferred limited or blanket anti­
trust immunity.36
3. Is the activity unilateral or the product of joint conduct?37
A  necessary element of a Sherman Act Section 1 case is some joint action in the 
form of a “contract,” “combination” or “conspiracy.” These are terms of art in 
antitrust law and practice. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, with the exception of 
“combinations” to monopolize, does not require joint activity and, therefore, can be 
violated by unilateral conduct or industry structure. The Clayton Act and the 
Robinson-Patman Act do not generally make joint activity the focus of illegality 
as does Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
4. Is the injury the result of activity derived from an industry’s structure or from 
a company’s behavior?
Antitrust policy categorizes impingements upon the competitive model as 
occurring in one of two ways: categories of behavior restraining trade,38 or in­
dustry structure in a particular market whereby structure alone has an adverse 
effect upon competition.39 A  joint agreement between two competitors to fix prices 
normally constitutes a behavioral violation whereas unilateral pricing or other 
decisions by a firm having substantially all the production in a given market may 
constitute a structural violation.
Although this structural-behavior dichotomy is not always clear in practice, it 
can be a useful distinction for signaling which statutes will be involved, or for 
determining the relevance of particular evidence and the complexity of litigation. 
As a general rule, Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act 
are aimed at behavioral violations while the monopolization provisions of Section 
2 of the Sherman Act and the merger provisions of Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
are aimed at structural violations. Attempts to monopolize, which are prohibited 
by Section 2 of the Sherman Act, partake of both structural and behavioral viola­
tions.40 The Robinson-Patman Act limitations on price discrimination are consider­
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30 Once it is discovered that there is a regulatory conflict or an exempting statute, this does not 
necessarily end antitrust analysis. It is often only the beginning of a highly complex and sophisticated 
analytical process which must be undertaken with extreme care.
31 The unilateral-conspirational dichotomy is derived from the language of the statutes. In particular,
§ 1 of the Sherman Act only strikes down “contracts,” “ combinations” or “ conspiracies” in restraint
of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Consequently, § 1 of the Sherman Act “ brands as illegal the
character of the restraint not the amount of commerce affected.” Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S.
469 (1940). See generally United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 n.59 (1940); Turner,
The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75
H a r v .  L. R e v .  655 (1962).
38 One textbook defines “ behavior or conduct”  to describe a firm’s acts. P . A r e e d a ,  A n t i t r u s t  
A n a l y s i s :  P r o b l e m s ,  T e x t ,  C a s e s , 132-33 (2d ed. 1974). Behavior does, of course, determine per­
formance, but it will be useful to distinguish acts from the “economic” appraisal of the industry’s 
success or failure.
® Areeda defines structure as follows: “Market structure concerns the breadth and character of 
the market, the number and size distribution of buyers and sellers, the capacity of firms to expand or 
enter, and other factors.” P. A r e e d a ,  supra note 38, at 133.
40 See Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic 
Riddle of Section Two, 72 M i c h .  L. R e v .  373 (1974); Attempt to Monopolize, supra note 24.
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ed behavioral restraints upon vertical market power by some41 and an attorney 
unemployment compensation scheme by others.42
5. Is the source of the activity “horizontal” or “vertical” ?
Antitrust conceptualization of economic impact and legal doctrines depends 
heavily upon whether the behavioral or structural problem is to be viewed as a 
problem across the same functional level of a market, or whether the difficulty is 
between different functional levels of a market, or whether it is a combination of 
the two. If the focus of litigation is across a functional level, i.e., between producers, 
or between wholesalers or between retailers, it is called horizontal. If the focus is 
upon different functional levels in a marketing system, i.e., between manufacturing 
and wholesaling, or between wholesaling and retailing, the difficulty is character­
ized as vertical.43
6. What is the “purpose” or the “effect” of the challenged conduct vis-a-vis the 
stated goals of antitrust policy?44
The degree to which competition is restrained in purpose or effect goes a long 
way in determining whether particular business conduct may be labeled a “per se” 
violation or whether the conduct must be analyzed on a “rule of reason” basis by a 
weighing process of numerous factors.40 The evolution of antitrust policy in the 
courts has seen the development of evidentiary presumptions of illegality called 
“per se” violations. These presumptions arise once conduct is identified as coming 
within a labeled category of behavior which the courts have identified as so destruc­
tive of the competitive model as to be unlawful in and of itself. In effect, in “per se” 
violation cases the courts have dispensed with the necessity of proving that such
“ See generally W. P a t m a n ,  C o m p l e t e  G u id e  t o  t h e  R o b in s o n - P a t m a n  A c t  (1963); FTC v. 
Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 395 U.S. 642 (1969). See 
also Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of the 
House Select Comm, on Small Business, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., vols. 1 & 2 (1969-70).
Criticism of the Robinson-Patman Act is widespread, both because of its complexity and because 
of the pro-competitive effects of some kinds of price discrimination. See generally Elman, The Robinson- 
Patman Act and Antitrust Policy: A Time for Reappraisal, 42 W a s h .  L. R e v .  1 (1966); Rowe, The 
Federal Trade Commission’s Administration of the Anti-price Discrimination Law— A  Paradox of 
Antitrust Policy, 64 C o l u m .  L. R e v .  415 (1964).
“ The impact of horizontal agreements (agreements between competitors) is often obviously anti­
competitive, while vertical market arrangements are not always so clearly anticompetitive. Compare 
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), with White Motor Co. v. United 
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), and Arnold, Scbwinn & Co. v. United States, 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Some­
times it might also be difficult to categorize the conduct as horizontal or vertical. See United States v. 
Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
*  Compare Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), with United States v. Jerrold 
Electronic Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), afj'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). Compare 
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), with United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 
310 U.S. 150 (1940).
45 The extent to which the conduct involved directly affects the goals of antitrust policy has a 
material impact on the use of per se rules. See generally Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 
50 Va. L. Rev. 23 (1964); Report of Special Subcomm. of Sherman Act Comm., The Per Se Rule, 38 
ABA A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 731 (1969).
conduct does in fact restrain trade. Once the conduct is proved, it is presumptively 
an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.46
The process of sorting out which statute and which section of a particular statute 
may be involved in a potential antitrust violation may not end with these general 
questions. These questions are, however, useful in normal fact situations to sort out 
the statutes, analyze burdens of proof, suggest defenses, determine the relevance of 
evidence and the necessity for a minimum or maximum degree of sophisticated 
economic analysis. In circumstances where the industry is regulated by state or 
federal law to some degree, where there is federal law immunizing some or all 
of the activity from antitrust analysis, or where there are factors nullifying federal 
jurisdiction, a bewildering array of other statutes may become involved in the legal 
analysis. Many of these special federal laws are collected in volume 4 of the CCH 
Trade Regulation Reporter,47 and all of the state antitrust and many special state 
laws may be found in the same volume.48 Even experienced antitrust practitioners 
occasionally overlook the existence of some special industry law, the availability 
of state antitrust claims, or the full analysis of particular regulatory scheme and its 
intricate relationship with antitrust policy. Thus, the second question in the list 
of general questions narrowing the analytical process is highly significant and 
should not be answered in a superficial manner.
R e c o g n iz in g  P o t e n t ia l  A n t it r u s t  P r o b l e m s
Certain categories of business activity raise clear antitrust implications and should 
be generally recognized by any attorney, regardless of antitrust experience, as 
potential areas of exposure to antitrust liabilities. If a client is asked by a competi­
tor,49 buyer50 or seller51 to set prices for selling goods or services,52 to refuse to deal
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46 Even though a practice might be a per se violation, proving that the specific activity does in fact 
equate with the per se unlawful practice may require a substantial effort and litigation. For example, 
in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the government claimed that several 
practices of the major oil companies constituted horizontal price fixing, a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act. Proof that the challenged practices had the purpose or effect of fixing prices required 
a lengthy trial producing a massive record.
" S e e  generally S. O p p e n h e im  & G. W e s t o n ,  F e d e r a l  A n t i t r u s t  L a w s :  C a s e s  & C o m m e n t s ,  37­
75 (3d ed. 1967); Jones, Antitrust and Specific Economic Regulation: An Introduction lo Comparative 
Analysis, 19 ABA A n t i t r u s t  L .J . 261 (1961).
18 See also J. F l y n n ,  F e d e r a l i s m  a n d  S t a t e  A n t i t r u s t  R e g u l a t i o n  (1964); French, The Minnesota 
Antitrust Law, 50 M i n n .  L. R e v .  59 (1965); Granger, A  Glimpse at a Plaintiff’s Remedies Under 
Kansas’ Antitrust Laws, 8 W a s h b u r n  L. R e v .  1 (1968); Hanson, Comparison o f State and Federal 
Antitrust Laws in Selected Areas, 29 ABA A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 267 (1965); Howland, Enforcement o f State 
Antitrust Laws from the Viewpoint o f the State Department o f Justice, 29 ABA A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 258 
(1965); Maroney, Antitrust in "T he Empire State’ ’ -. Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices in New  
York. State, 19 S y r a c u s e  L. R e v .  819 (1968); Note, Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice Regulation in 
Utah, 8 U t a h  L. R e v .  339 (1964).
“ Outright agreements by competitors to fix prices are seldom litigated since they are uniformly 
held unlawful. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United 
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 
F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). There may be exceptions due to peculiar charac­
teristics of a particular business, Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), or because of 
unusual economic conditions, Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). But once 
price fixing is shown— which may not be easy—United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 
150 (1940), it is declared unlawful. It matters not whether the price fixed is a maximum or minimum
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with a buyer53 or seller,54 to grant or receive exclusive territorial markets,55 to 
purchase or sell products exclusively from one seller66 or to one buyer,57 or to buy 
or sell a product only when the seller or buyer agrees to buy or purchase some other 
product,58 his attorney had better watch out! Likewise, if a client is injured by 
others doing these things, his attorney should start to keep track of the damages. 
In antitrust lore these actions are known as price fixing,59 concerted refusals to 
deal,*0 market divisions,'"exclusive dealing62 and tie-ins.03
The legality or illegality of these practices depends upon a weighing of the facts 
developed by asking the above series of questions and evaluating the answers in 
light of the goals of antitrust policy. For example, horizontal price fixing is con­
demned, regardless of the amount of commerce involved or laudable motives, be­
cause it is a direct attack upon competition as the neutral mechanism for govern­
ing trade 64 and because it establishes a private pricing mechanism which eliminates 
the independence of decision makers and consumers in the marketplace.05 The 
drastic infringement of horizontal price fixing upon antitrust goals is so great that 
it is considered “per se” unlawful.66 Consequently, there need not be much evidence
price or whether the price is “ stabilized.” United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 
(1969); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
“ Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
"Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Parke, Davis 6c Co., 362 U.S. 29 
(1960); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
B See, e.g., United States v. National Ass’n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
“  Unilateral refusals to deal might be unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act if a “ combina­
tion”  can be found. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 
U.S. 13 (1964); Note, "Combinations”  in Restraint of Trade: A  New Approach to Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, 1966 U t a h  L. R e v .  75. A more rational approach to unilateral refusals to deal should be 
developed under § 2 of the Sherman Act and its ban upon “attempts to monopolize.” See 
Attempt to Monopolize, supra note 24. Concerted refusals to deal with a buyer are per se unlawful. 
Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators’ Guild of 
America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
M Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Eastern States 
Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
“ Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
"  Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
57Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S. 700 (1969); Tampa 
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
“ Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); 
International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
“  See cases cited notes 49-52 supra.
w See cases cited notes 53-54 supra.
81 See cases cited note 55 supra.
63 See cases cited notes 56-57 supra.
88 See cases cited note 58 supra.
111 See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United States v. Socony- 
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
“  See authorities cited note 64 supra. See also Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 
340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
x  See Loevinger, supra note 45.
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with a buyer 53 or seller,54 to grant or receive exclusive territorial markets,55 to 
purchase or sell products exclusively from one seller56 or to one buyer,57 or to buy 
or sell a product only when the seller or buyer agrees to buy or purchase some other 
product,58 his attorney had better watch out! Likewise, if a client is injured by 
others doing these things, his attorney should start to keep track of the damages. 
In antitrust lore these actions are known as price fixing,59 concerted refusals to 
deal,60 market divisions,'"exclusive dealing62 and tie-ins.®3 
The legality or illegality of these practices depends upon a weighing of the facts 
developed by asking the above series of questions and evaluating the answers in 
light of the goals of antitrust policy. For example, horizontal price fixing is con­
demned, regardless of the amount of commerce involved or laudable motives, be­
cause it is a direct attack upon competition as the neutral mechanism for govern­
ing trade64 and because it establishes a private pricing mechanism which eliminates 
the independence of decision makers and consumers in the marketplace/’5 The 
drastic infringement of horizontal price fixing upon antitrust goals is so great that 
it is considered “per se” unlawful.86 Consequently, there need not be much evidence
price or whether the price is “ stabilized.” United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 
(1969); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
“ Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
“ Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
B S « , e.g., United States v. National Ass’n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
53 Unilateral refusals to deal might be unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act if a “ combina­
tion” can be found. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 
U.S. 13 (1964); Note, "Combinations”  in Restraint o j Trade: A  New Approach to Section 1 o j the 
Sherman Act, 1966 U t a h  L. R e v .  75. A more rational approach to unilateral refusals to deal should b e  
developed under § 2 of the Sherman Act and its ban upon “attempts to monopolize.” See 
Attempt to Monopolize, supra note 24. Concerted refusals to deal with a buyer are per se unlawful. 
Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators’ Guild of 
America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
MRadiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Eastern States 
Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
65Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
“ Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
01 Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S. 700 (1969); Tampa 
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
“ Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Northern Pac. Ry. 
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); 
International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
“  See cases cited notes 49-52 supra.
“  See cases citcd notes 53-54 supra.
"  See cases cited note 55 supra.
"S e e  cases cited notes 56-57 supra.
a  See cases cited note 58 supra.
“  See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United States v. Socony- 
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
M See authorities cited note 64 supra. See also Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 
340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
"  See Loevinger, supra note 45.
demonstrating a conspiracy to fix prices nor is it necessary to prove that the price 
fixing “unreasonably restrains trade.” Any concerted action by competitors tam­
pering with competition as the mechanism for setting prices is usually sufficient 
evidence of an unlawful contract or conspiracy.07 Once the conduct is labeled price 
fixing, it is presumed to unreasonably restrain trade.68
The same may be said for vertical price fixing, except here the conduct also im­
poses restraints upon alienation.09 While vertical price fixing usually eliminates 
only intrabrand competition and is not as great an infringement of competition, 
it too is condemned without proof of the degree to which it unduly restrains trade.70 
Although there may be arguments that vertical price fixing promotes economic 
efficiency, the destructive effect of vertical price fixing upon the other goals of 
antitrust policy is so great that condemnation out of hand is warranted.
These are not necessarily easy cases, because it is often difficult to prove that the 
conduct fixes prices,71 or that the fixed price is the result of duality.72 But once 
duality in fixing prices is proved, it is assumed that the restraint upon competition 
is unreasonable. As the purpose or effect of business conduct less directly affects the 
basic goals of antitrust policy, the degree of proof necessary to establish that the 
conduct involved “unreasonably restrains trade or commerce,” or is the product 
of duality, increases. In effect, there is a sliding evidentiary scale such that as the 
effect of the conduct less directly impinges upon the goals of antitrust policy, there 
is an increasing burden of proof that the conduct is conspiratorial or that the 
product and geographic markets are well defined and the impact of the conduct is 
an unreasonable restraint of trade. In other words, the litigation shifts from proof 
of a certain type of conduct to proof of the adverse effects or purpose of the con­
duct involved.73 When this occurs, one is involved with a rule of reason case, where 
the legal rules are few; here the litigation can be long, expensive, and complicated; 
and juries are deciding the law as well as the facts.
In a rule of reason case, analysis will center upon a number of elusive factors: 
the characteristics of the particular industry involved, the power of the parties to the 
litigation, the motive and purpose underlying the challenged conduct, the effect of 
the conduct, a measurement of benefits and detriments in light of the central 
goals of antitrust policy and whether there are less restrictive alternative means for 
achieving the otherwise legitimate objectives sought by the practice. The appro-
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"  United States v. Container Corp. o£ America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
“ United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
“ United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 
U.S. 365 (1967); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
™ See authorities cited note 69 supra.
"S ee , e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
” See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. o£ America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United States v. 
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). The development o£ a broad definition o£ "combination,” 
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), should shift litigation from the irrelevant search for 
duality to the question of whether conduct infringes upon the goals of antitrust policy. See Note, 
“ Combinations" in Restraint o f Trade: A  N ew Approach to Section 1 o f the Sherman Act, 1966 U t a h  
L. R e v .  75.
13 Compare United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), with White Motor Co. v. United 
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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priate mix of these factors varies from case to case as the courts seek to accom­
modate the demands of antitrust policy to the practical needs of a particular in­
dustry.74 The intelligent and sophisticated analysis of a rule of reason case, how­
ever, depends upon a careful analysis of these factors and the skillful persuasion 
of the court as to the appropriate mix applicable in light of the practicalities of the 
industry and the central goals of antitrust laws.
L it ig a t in g  a n  A n t it r u s t  L a w s u i t
Many lawyers have difficulties with proving or disproving an antitrust case since 
they have a tendency to conceptualize the broad outlines of the case in terms of a 
traditional tort case— duty, breach and damage. In general, an antitrust case does 
not break down that way. If it is a Sherman Act Section 1 case, the essence of the 
violation is duality which unreasonably restrains competition and causes injury 
or damage to the plaintiff in his business or property. If it is a Sherman Act Section
2 monopolization case or a Clayton Act Section 7 case, the essence of the violation 
is structural and one must prove that the defendant’s structure gives it power to set 
prices or exclude competitors in some relevant market or that a merger or acquisi­
tion may be to substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly in some rele­
vant market. Analysis of violations based upon attempts to monopolize is unsettled, 
but the better thinking would treat them as behavioral violations which require 
proof of unilateral conduct to exclude competitors or fix prices without justification 
or excuse.75 Present case law, with little guidance from the Supreme Court, em­
phasizes a structural approach to attempt cases by requiring (1) proof of a relevant 
geographic and product market dominated by a firm having a substantial share 
of the market, (2) evidence of a specific intent or predatory conduct to monopolize 
that market and (3) a dangerous probability of attaining a monopoly.76 The law 
has remained similar to criminal law concepts of attempts ever since Justice 
Holmes’ opinion in Swift & Co. v. United States.11 The consequence of the con­
fusion has been a series of cases pinpointing a gap in the Sherman Act’s coverage 
of business practices impinging on the competitive model, because unilateral pre­
datory conduct absent a dangerous probability of monopolizing a relevant market 
is not considered actionable.78 In order to extend coverage to such cases the courts 
have gready expanded the definitions of contract, combination and conspiracy—  
beyond their meaning elsewhere in the law and perhaps to a level of generality that
n See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Board of Trade v. United 
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (SJ3.N.Y. 1953).
75 See Attempt to Monopolize, supra note 24.
76 For an exhaustive survey and critique o£ the cases on attempt to monopolize see Cooper, Attempts 
and Monopolization: A  Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle o j Section Two, 72 
M i c h .  L .  R e v .  373 (1974).
77196 U.S. 375 (1905).
™See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Attempt to Monopolize, supra note 24; Walker 
Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965); United States v. Johns-Manville 
Corp., 231 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
is meaningless— in order to restrain the more obvious abuses of unilateral market 
power.79
These kinds of cases point up the need to exercise great care in the drafting of 
an antitrust complaint or answer. Knowledge of subtle distinctions in substantive 
antitrust law as well as creative drafting are essential before discovery, litigation 
and jury instructions preclude claims that might have been available or defenses 
which may or may not be relevant. Consequently, drafting from forms or previous 
complaints in other cases is an extremely risky business absent a sophisticated under­
standing of antitrust theory, a fundamental working knowledge of the industry 
involved and an intimate familiarity with the facts of the case available in the 
pre-filing stage. There may be a temptation to draft a shotgun complaint or answer 
involving every conceivable theory available. The temptation should be resisted 
since a broad complaint, answer or counterclaim invites a war of attrition in the 
discovery process and a protracted trial, assuming that one’s resources survive 
massive discovery.
There are several overriding practical considerations that influence the filing of 
or defense of any treble damage suit.80 A  major concern to both plaintiffs and 
defendants is the cost of litigation. Any substantial antitrust litigation will likely 
involve a minimum of 500 to 1,000 hours of time, plus endless taxable costs for 
depositions, interrogatories, transcripts, and expert witness fees. The fact that 
successful treble damage claimants are awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and 
taxable costs should not overshadow the fact that unsuccessful plaintiffs must bear 
their own costs and attorney’s fees. Consequently, contingent fee contracts are a 
risky business in substantial antitrust litigation, because it is not difficult to exceed 
$100,000 in costs and attorneys fees in successfully litigating a treble damage claim. 
In the recent T W A  v. Hughes litigation,81 for example, where the plaintiff 
T W A  obtained a 45 million dollar verdict trebled to a 135 million dollar judg­
ment, the plaintiff’s attorneys requested counsel fees of $10,500,000 and $2,230,602 
for costs of suit. The court awarded 7.5 million in attorneys fees and allowed only 
taxable costs. All this went for naught, however, when the Supreme Court reversed 
the judgment and dismissed the claim on a technical jurisdictional ground, leaving 
the plaintiff and its counsel to bear the loss of costs and attorney fees.82 While that 
case is somewhat unique, it should give one an idea of the expense and risk involved 
in undertaking major antitrust litigation.
The nature of the issues and the evidence which may be used by either side make 
possible a defendant’s war of attrition in an effort to defeat a plaintiff’s claim. Con­
sequently, an imaginative defendant can easily escalate costs to the point of bank­
79 See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 33 (1969); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 
390 U.S. 145 (1968); Rahls, Conspiracy and Antitrust Lams, 44 III. L. R e v .  743 (1950); Turner, 
The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 
H a r v .  L. R e v .  655 (1962).
80 For excellent symposia stressing the practical factors of treble damage litigation for plaintiffs and 
defendants see Symposium, American Bar Association National Institute on Preparation and Trial of an 
Antitrust Treble Damage Suit, 38 A B A  A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 1 (1968) and Symposium, 1973 National In­
stitute on the Corporate Trust Busters, 43 A B A  A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 6 (1973).
81 4 5 8  B.N.A. A n t i t r u s t  & T r a d e  R e g .  R e p .  A - 4  (April 21, 1970).
“ Hughes Tool Co. v. TWA, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
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rupting the plaintiff’s attorney as well as the plaintiff. Conversely, defendants may 
face a hard choice in deciding whether to fully litigate all the issues, since they 
may only be increasing the plaintiff’s attorney’s fee if the plaintiff prevails. Thus, 
an initial and difficult question facing any plaintiff’s attorney and any defense at­
torney is a hard-headed financial assessment of the costs of the litigation and the 
amount of time counsel will spend on the case. Such an assessment should make 
an attorney hesitant to take the case on a contingent fee basis. Factors to consider, 
in addition to the type of case and the kind of evidence needed to prove the case, 
should include the possibilities of a class action and, most importantly, whether or 
not there has been prior government litigation against the defendant. The Clayton 
Act makes litigated judgments83 and litigated convictions84 prima facie evidence 
of a violation of the antitrust laws. Consequently, prior government litigation can 
make a plaintiff’s case much easier. If the defendant pleaded nolo contendere in a 
prior government criminal case or entered a consent decree in a prior government 
civil case, the prima facie provision of the Clayton Act is not applicable. If, how­
ever, grand jury proceedings were held, it may be possible to get access to some 
of the grand jury proceedings85 which may be of great value in proving a violation 
of the law. In view of the difficulty of proving a violation, some plaintiffs’ lawyers 
only take treble damage claims where there has been a prior litigated judgment or 
conviction. By mitigating or eliminating the necessity to prove the antitrust viola­
tion, the issues— which may still be complicated and expensive to litigate— become: 
proving a connection between the violation and the plaintiff’s claimed injury86 
and proving the amount of the injury. In any event, a substantial retainer should 
be the rule rather than the exception if you propose to fully and adequately re­
present your client in private treble damage litigation.
The antitrust litigator must have a full understanding of the business involved—  
from the jargon of the trade used by the lowest employee to the intricacies of the 
kind of financing utilized by the business. Otherwise he won’t understand what he 
finds in discovery and he will not be able to make intelligent use of it during trial. 
Before extensive discovery is undertaken, an attorney should acquire a working 
knowledge of the business from his client, employees, trade journals, or any other 
sources he may have available.
83 See generally Flynn, Consent Decrees in Antitrust Enforcement: Some Thoughts and Proposals, 53 
I o w a  L. R e v .  983 (1968); Shores, Treble Damage Antitrust Suits: Admissibility o f Prior Judgments 
Under Section 5 of the Clayton Act, 54 I o w a  L. R e v .  434 (1968); Comment, Consent Decrees and 
the Private Action: An Antitrust Dilemma, 53 C a l i f .  L. R e v .  627 (1965).
81 See generally Seamans, Winson, & McCartney, Use of Criminal Pleas in Aid to  Private Antitrust
Actions, 10 A n t i t r u s t  B u l l .  795 (1965); Symposium, Trial o f an Antitrust Treble Damage Suit, In­
cluding Effect o f Guilty Verdicts and Nolo Contendere Pleas, Development and Proof o f Economic
Issues, Handling Documentary Evidence, Causation and Damages, 38 ABA A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 48 (1968);
Note, Nolo Pleas in Antitrust Cases, 79 H a r v .  L. R e v .  1475 (1966); Note, Closing an Antitrust Loophole:
Collateral Effect for Nolo Pleas and Government Settlements, 55 Va. L. R e v .  1334 (1969).
85 McSwecnry, Privileged Communications, Attorney’s Wor\ Product, Confidential Information and
Availability of Governmental Investigative Piles and Grand Jury Transcripts, 38 ABA A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 
24 (1968). *
89 See generally Pollock, The “ Injury”  and " Causation”  Elements o f a Treble Damage Antitrust 
Action, 57 Nw. U.L. R e v .  691 (1963); Wright, Legal Cause in Treble Damage Actions Under the 
Clayton Act, 27 M d . L. R e v .  275 (1967).
In most antitrust cases many of the issues may be decided on the basis of docu­
ments. A  good attorney should learn how his client keeps documents and how his 
opponent keeps documents. Most businesses keep too many documents and a 
thorough examination of a client’s files, assuming the client is conscientious, should 
provide the attorney with a good profile on the types of documents he may expect to 
find in his opponent’s files. It is rare, but not unheard of, to find copies of docu­
ments stamped “burn after reading.” It is far more common, however, to find 
endless reams of statistics, pricing information, and correspondence that must be 
constructed into a logical and understandable whole so the attorney can plan his 
case. One good document, fully understood and properly used, is of great value in 
antitrust litigation. One can usually get documents which describe just about all 
phases of the opponent’s business and the major problem is sifting the relevant from 
the irrelevant and putting the mass into an intelligible and manageable form for 
trial. Consequently, it is absolutely essential to establish a uniform and consistent 
indexing system for documents involved in antitrust litigation.
Interrogatories and depositions can be especially useful to discover what docu­
ments an opponent may have in his possession. In particular, interrogatories can 
be used to make the other side do one’s work in researching their files to answer 
what documents may be available to construct your financial information. Inter­
rogatories and depositions are exceptionally helpful in assisting in the impeachment 
of witnesses because antitrust litigation often produces head-on collisions in inter­
preting past events, motive and purpose. Destruction of an opposing witness’s credi­
bility can be a most important factor in proving or disproving motive and purpose. 
In summary, the topic of discovery in antitrust litigation is vast and complicated.87
Trial lawyers are always interested in proof of damages. In the antitrust field 
this topic is a field of expertise in and of itself. In general, a plaintiff first must prove 
that an antitrust violation caused him injury in his business or property and then 
prove the amount of injury that resulted. Very often the plaintiff finds that he must 
prove a negative: what would have happened to his business if the illegal activity 
had not taken place? Moreover, a plaintiff must show a direct injury to his business 
or property “by reason of” a violation of the antitrust laws.88 This is a vague stand­
ing to sue standard of the Palsgraff variety, designed to place some limit upon the 
scope of treble damage liability.89
Once a plaintiff has proven (1) an antitrust violation, (2) a connection between 
the violation and injury to his business or property and (3) that he was in the
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“target area of the violation,” 90 he must provide some rational method to measure 
damages. At one time, the requirement of certainty in proof of damages and proof 
of a connection between the violation and the damage were major stumbling 
blocks for treble damage litigants.91 Due to the nature of an antitrust violation, the 
proof of most injuries is an attempt to measure what “would have been,” but for the 
antitrust violation. In general, four types of damages have been recognized by the 
courts: (1) lost profits; (2) the amount of increased cost or the amount of an 
artificial price increase; (3) loss of good will or a capital loss; and (4) out-of-pocket 
expenses. Various methods have been developed for measuring such damages and 
they should be carefully studied well in advance of discovery and trial.92
A  final factor in this survey is the assessment of attorney’s fees. A  successful 
treble damage claimant is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, 
both of which are assessed in the discretion of the court.93 In dollar amount, some 
of the attorney’s fees awarded have been extraordinary. In one case, the attorney’s 
fee arrangment was fixed pursuant to a contingent fee arrangement and resulted 
in a 25% contingent fee on a 25 million dollar class action settlement in a price 
fixing case.94 Needless to say, such fees are few and far between— and some are 
exorbitant under the facts of the case involved. Most courts assess an attorney’s fee 
on the amount of time involved, the complexity of the issues, the length of trial, 
the prevailing rates in the area, and the responsibility and effort involved. Con­
sequently, the antitrust litigator must keep detailed time records because he will be 
called upon to prove the reasonableness of the fee claimed. In antitrust litigation, 
the financial rewards can be great, but it is well to remember that the financial 
losses can be just as great.
C o n c l u s io n
The art of legal research and writing is knowing when to stop and having the 
emotional ability to do so, despite fears of leaving a stone unturned or a phrase 
better said. Furthermore, surveying a field as vast as antitrust treble damage litiga­
tion in a single article can be misleading. The legal issues and the practical problems 
of antitrust litigation are sophisticated and complex. For the lawyer who is dedicat­
ed to the exciting life of trial practice, however, antitrust litigation can be rewarding 
and challenging. The theory is profound; the stakes are high; the challenges are 
great. But of even more importance is the great need for talented trial lawyers to 
enter the field. The goals of antitrust policy are too important to allow them to be 
sacrificed by default.
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